Abstract. We provide nonemptiness results of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication in large quasilinear economies, where every agent's informational size is small. We offer results for both replica and more general sequences of economies.
Introduction
In this paper we consider nonemptiness of the core in interim exchange economies with asymmetric information when agents' informational size is small (McLean and Postlewaite (2002) ). Within this model of informational size, previous results are available for the ex ante core Postlewaite (2003, 2005) ), but existence results for the interim core are missing.
1 If coalitions are formed at the interim stage, we need to specify the information that agents in a coalition are allowed to use in constructing an objection.
Depending on the extent of communication within the coalition, several interim core concepts have been proposed. The literature began with concepts where communication is exogenous, such as the coarse core and the fine core in Wilson (1978) , but more recently, interim cores with endogenous communication have been made available; see Forges, Minelli, and Vohra (2002) or Forges and Serrano (2013) for surveys.
The current paper concentrates on a class of interim cores with endogenous information transmission, namely, the core with respect to (w.r.t.) equilibrium blocking, as termed in Kamishiro and Serrano (2011) . Indeed, Serrano and Vohra (2007) show that several core notions previously proposed in the literature, such as the credible core in Dutta and Vohra (2005) or the virtual-utility core in Myerson (2007) , can be unified into the notion of core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking (see Kamishiro and Serrano (2011) for a further elaboration).
In general, when incentive constraints are incorporated into core notions, it is difficult to obtain nonemptiness of interim cores of exchange economies, given the results in Vohra (1999) and Forges, Mertens, and Vohra (2002) , which show that the incentive-compatible coarse core, a superset of all cores w.r.t equilibrium blocking, might be empty. This suggests the consideration of approximate cores, where the blocking constraints are somewhat relaxed.
Going in that direction, this paper considers large economies, and restricts attention to quasilinear preferences. Assumptions made on the information structure will in general matter for the results one can obtain. For instance, Kamishiro, Serrano, and Wooders (2015) consider the case where there is a small number of informed agents and an unbounded number of uninformed agents. In fact, the bulk of their argument is built around economies with exclusive information, in which there are finitely-many monopolists of different pieces of information. The paper shows that, in large quasilinear economies, the "small group effectiveness" condition suffices to obtain nonemptiness of approximate interim cores w.r.t. equilibrium blocking. In contrast, it also shows that the exact incentive-compatible coarse core might still be empty. In order to obtain nonemptiness of approximate interim cores, we mainly rely on the results of Dutta and Vohra (2005) and Kamishiro and Serrano (2011) . These results establish that having an ex post core allocation that is incentive compatible is sufficient in quasilinear economies to show that the core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking be nonempty. This is the reason to restrict attention to quasilinear preferences, and we do not know whether the argument extends to more general settings. In addition, a variant of a lemma in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) , adapted to our model, will be key to complete our proof, by allowing us to construct an incentive-compatible rule that lies in the approximate ex post core.
This brief paper proceeds as follows: while section 2 provides the basic framework and definitions, and briefly reviews the notions of informational size in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) , section 3 offers nonemptiness results of the approximate interim core.
The Model
We consider sequences of economies with the property that all agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002) . These authors consider a model in which the agents' utility functions depend on an underlying but unobserved state of nature, and in which each agent receives a private signal that is correlated with the state.
Notation and Definitions
We begin with a few preliminaries in order to define a pre-economy and an economy. Let that agent type i ∈ N might receive and let T = ∏ i T i . We take as given a probability distribution, denoted by P , on Θ × T . We assume that for every θ, θ
The consumption set of each agent type, denoted by X i , is R L−1 + × R and for each θ ∈ Θ, e i ∈ X i denotes the (state-independent) endowment of agent type i in state θ ∈ Θ.
The preferences of agent type i are represented by a utility function u i : R
is the utility function of agent type i in state θ. We note that in this model agents' utility functions do not depend on T , but do depend on the state of nature.
The collection E = ({u i , X i , e i , T i } i∈N , Θ, P ) will be called a private information preeconomy. And for each state θ ∈ Θ, the collection {u i (·, θ), e i } i∈N defines an associated (complete information) pre-economy.
A profile on N is a function f from N to Z + , the nonnegative integers; we interpret f (i) as the number of agents with the same type. Given the set of agent types N and a profile f , we denote the agent set as N, i.e., N = {(i, j) : i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , f (i)}. Let ∥f ∥ denote the number of agents in a group represented by a profile f , i.e., ∥f ∥ = ∑ i∈N f (i). We begin by considering exact replicas; that is, sequences of economies where the r th economy has r agents of each type. This yields simpler mathematical expressions and more transparent arguments. However, we are able to extend our results for the case of more general sequences, as we explain below. That is, we begin by considering only profiles f of agent types such that
Given a pre-economy E and a profile f , let
be a private information economy, with ∥f ∥(= r × n agents, for some integer r, satisfying the following conditions. (Hereafter we denote
(4) P f is a probability distribution on Θ × T f satisfying the following 2 :
(a) For each j = 1, 2, . . . , r, and each (θ,
(b) for each θ, the probability distributions over
are independent given θ.
Thus, E f is a private information economy with ∥f ∥ agents, containing r copies of each agent type i ∈ N . With the standard nonredundancy assumption on the probability distributions, by the law of large numbers, it follows that, if r is sufficiently large for all i, and if one could pool all signals, then one could assign a probability to each state that is arbitrarily close to 1. We note that no agent's information is redundant in this process: regardless of the number of copies, each agent still has information that cannot be inferred from the aggregate information of other agents.
Core Notions
Let E f be a private information economy. For each S ⊆ N, S-feasible allocations for the economy are of the form z :
For ease of notation, we often denote agent (i, j) simply by k. An S-feasible allocation
2 These sequences are called conditionally independent replicas in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) .
An incentive compatible allocation z for N is in the core with respect to (w.r.t.) equilibrium blocking of some class of coalitional communication mechanisms whenever there does not exist an equilibrium rejection of z, i.e., a random blocking plan against z, for a communication mechanism in that class; see Kamishiro and Serrano (2011) for details.
Particular cases of this definition are the following:
• The incentive-compatible coarse core (Vohra (1999)) corresponds to the core of no communication mechanism.
• The credible core (Dutta and Vohra (2005) ) corresponds to the core of deterministic mechanisms.
• The virtual-utility core (Myerson (2007)) corresponds to the core of measurable random mechanisms.
• The randomized mediated core (Serrano and Vohra (2007)) corresponds to the core of unrestricted random mechanisms.
The larger the class of communication mechanisms considered, the smaller the corresponding core. It follows that the core notions just described are therefore nested, the latter one being the smallest.
Coalition S is said to have an ex post objection to a feasible allocation z for N if there exist y S ∈ A S and t f ∈ T f such that
The ex post core is the set of allocations to which there is no ex post objection.
The inclusion of the ex post core allocations satisfying incentive compatibility in the core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking of unrestricted random communication mechanisms was shown in Kamishiro and Serrano (2011, Proposition 3.1) , which follows an argument in Dutta and Vohra (2005, Proposition 5 .1) for the credible core.
Given ε > 0, coalition S is said to have an ε-ex post objection to z if there exist
The ε-ex post core (or approximate ex post core) is the set of all allocations to which no coalition has an ε-ex post objection. The definitions of approximate or ε-interim blocking and its associated cores combine the definitions of ε-blocking and interim cores in the obvious way, and are therefore omitted.
Definitions on Informational Size
For the private information economy E f , we define next the notions of informational size, aggregate uncertainty, and distributional variability, originally introduced in McLean and
Postlewaite (2002), as follows:
1. Informational size:
Let P f Θ be the conditional probability distribution on Θ given t f ∈ T f . Any array of agents' types t f = (t −k , t k ) ∈ T f induces a conditional distribution on Θ and, if agent k unilaterally changes his announced signal from t k to t ′ k , this conditional distribution in general will also change. We consider agent k to be informationally small if, for each t k , there is a small probability assigned to the event that he can induce a large change in the conditional distribution on Θ by changing his announced signal from t k to some other t ′ k . McLean and Postlewaite (2002) formalized this in the following definition.
where ∥ · ∥ is the 1-norm.
The informational size of agent k is defined as
Loosely speaking, we will say that agent k is informationally small with respect to P f if his informational size ν
then the effect of this misreport is a change in the conditional
the probability that k can have a large influence on the conditional distribution on Θ by reporting t ′ k instead of t k when his observed signal is t k . An agent is informationally small if for each of his possible signals t k , he assigns small probability to the event that he can have a large influence on the distribution P f Θ (· | t −k , t k ), given his observed signal.
Negligible aggregate uncertainty:
Next, aggregate uncertainty can be quantified. Let
where I θ denotes the measure that puts all its mass on state θ.
is small for each k, then we will say that P f exhibits negligible aggregate uncertainty. In this case, each agent knows that, conditional on his own signal, the aggregate information of all agents will, with high probability, provide a good prediction of the true state.
Distributional variability:
To define the measure of variability, we first define a metric d on the simplex ∆ Θ as follows: for each α, β ∈ ∆ Θ , let
where ∥ · ∥ 2 denotes the 2-norm. Hence, d(α, β) measures the Euclidean distance between the normalizations of α and β. We define
This is a measure of the variability of the conditional distribution P f Θ (· | t k ) as a function of t k .
The Main Result
Next, we present an important lemma for our main result: 
(iv) for all agents (i, j) in the profile f and all t
where 
where c(η, A) is the number given in Lemma A.1 in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) introduced below (we use this lemma later; we omit to write down the definition of the function c since we will only directly use the lemma.) 
where we recall that ∥ · ∥ is the 1-norm. Let
We rely on the following:
Lemma (McLean and Postlewaite (2002, Lemma A.1)). Let
Applying this lemma, there exists a collection ({y i (t i , θ h )} (t i ,θ h )∈T i ×Θ ) i∈N satisfying the above three conditions. In the private information economy, Let z(·) be the allocation defined as
where (x (i,j) (t f )) (i,j) is an ex post core allocation in signal profile t f when agents' profile is f . The proof of the lemma can now be completed using exactly the same arguments as in Kamishiro (2011) .
From this lemma, we can obtain the following nonemptiness result of the approximate core. Proof : Given ε > 0, let
and η := ε 1 + K 1 .
We pick a Walrasian equilibrium allocation for all the economies in a replication sequence, which, in the case of replicas, is simply an allocation for the basic economy 
We will show that this leads to a contradiction.
On the other hand,
These imply that
Thus, we conclude that
contradicting the assumption that (ζ k (θ h )) k∈N is a Walrasian allocation of the associated economy in state θ h . Therefore, the allocation z(·) is not ex post ε-blocked by any coalition,
i.e., it therefore must belong to the ex post ε-core of the r × n agents' economy.
Finally, we can extend our result to general nonreplica sequences, as follows: This theorem clearly holds since we can regard an economy consisting of g(i) copies of each characteristic i as another original pre-economy. Kovalenkov and Wooders (2003) define the ε 1 -remainder ε 2 -core in a complete information setting. Following their definition, the ε 1 -remainder ε 2 -core in our model is defined as an incentive compatible allocation in the ε 2 core of a sub-profile containing all but a fraction ε 1 of the agents. We can therefore state the following: 
